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ARE THE BORDERS CLOSING? Errico TO Reid:
A NEW COURT AND AN AGING FRONTIER
VICKI JOINER MUSTO* AND JUDITH RUFFO**
The number of illegal aliens in the United States with the conse-
quent economic and social problems continues to increase. One
response from the United States Supreme Court is a limitation
of the waiver of deportation provision for illegal aliens who gained
entry through a misrepresentation, but have families partially
composed of United States citizens. The author suggests that this
change in emphasis goes too far in restricting congressional intent
to preserve family unity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States, the land built by immigrants, continues to
hold an attraction for people seeking to begin anew, be it legally or
otherwise. According to statistics provided by the United States
Department of Justice, during the fiscal year 1974, the total annual
limit on legal immigration of aliens was 290,000;1 however, even
* Attorney, Florida Rural Legal Services; Member, Florida Bar; J.D., Catholic Univer-
sity of America.
** J.D. candidate, University of Miami School of Law.
1. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1974).
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conservative government estimates place illegal entrance of aliens
at over 1 million.2 The problems created by this large illegal alien
population include: 1) the elimination of jobs which would other-
wise be held by United States citizens; 2) a drain on social services
of all types with minimal or no payment of taxes by the illegal alien;
3) depression of the wages paid American workers; and 4) aggrava-
tion of the balance of payments deficits by the sending of American
currency out of the United States.
The social problems, real or imagined, are stirring proposals for
counter-measures. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), along with Congressman Peter Rodino, are proposing that
legislation be passed which will penalize an employer who know-
ingly hires illegal aliens; that is, requiring that employers hire only
persons with proof of United States citizenship.'
The problem, when considered in the aggregate, becomes ab-
stract. The problem must be considered in human terms: What is
to be done about a native of another country, i.e., an "alien," who
has lived in this country and who has become part of family com-
posed partially of United States citizens or permanent resident
aliens when it is later discovered that the person originally gained
entry into this country through some form of misrepresentation?
Congress' solution to this problem is contained in the Immigration
and Nationality Act section 241(f):
2. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE SIXTH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE
136 (1974).
3. See Braden, "Illegal Aliens: A Choice of Evils," Wash. Post, Apr. 18, 1975; "Illegal
Immigrants," Parade Magazine, Mar. 30, 1975, at 4; Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 1975 at 1; See also,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, "Proposals to Prohibit Employ-
ment of Illegal Aliens," Legislative Analysis No. 6, 94th Congress, October 30, 1975. This is
an analysis of the Rodino Bill, H.R. 8713, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and the Kennedy Bill,
S. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) from the points of view of their proponents and those of
free market theorists.
The Rodino Bill would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act § 274, 8 U.S.C. §
1324 (1970) to impose a system of civil-criminal penalties upon those who knowingly employ
illegal aliens. The bill would allow a procedural change having a significant effect: an illegal
alien from the Western Hemisphere would adjust his status to that of permanent resident
alien without having to return to his home country. Pertinent to the purposes of this article
is the provision in section 2 that an illegal alien related to a United States citizen and
physically present in the United States since June 30, 1965, would be eligible for adjustment
of status.
The Kennedy Bill differs from the Rodino Bill in that there is no scienter provision, and
there is liability only for civil penalties. The Kennedy Bill also makes changes in the adjust-
ment of status provisions, requiring physical presence for 3 years as of January 1, 1975, or
illegal presence and entry before October 3, 1965.
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The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens
within the United States on the ground that they were excludable
at the time of entry as aliens who have sought to procure, or have
procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United
States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien
otherwise admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse, par-
ent, or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.4
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that this
legislative treatment is no solution. This section has been construed
twice by the Supreme Court, once by the Warren Court, and re-
cently by the Burger Court, with seemingly contradictory results.
The Warren Court expressed its construction of section 241(f) in the
consolidated Errico and Scott cases of 1966.1 The decision estab-
lished that section 241(f) applied to any deportation order resulting
directly from the misrepresentation made by the alien at time of
entry, regardless of the section of the statute under which the order
was brought.' Thus, under the Warren Court, section 241(f) afforded
an encompassing protection from deportation to the alien, related
to a United States citizen or a lawful resident alien, who gained
entry through misrepresentation.
The Burger Court has withdrawn much of this protection from
the alien and his family. On March 18, 1975, the Court, in Reid v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service,' announced that the
waiver of the deportation provision of section 241(f) is applicable
exclusively to deportation charges which are based on section 212(a)
(19),' pertaining to aliens excludable because of entry by fraud or
misrepresentation, and which are brought under section 241(a)(1),
which enumerates quota requirements for entry.' The effect of this
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(0 (as amended through 1970).
5. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
6. 385 U.S. at 217.
7. 420 U.S. 619 (1975).
8. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1970) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens
shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the
United States . . .
(19) Any alien who seeks to procure, or has sought to procure, or has procured a
visa or other documentation, or seeks to enter the United States, by fraud, or by
willfully misrepresenting a material fact.
9. 420 U.S. at 630, referring to section 212(a)(19). See note 8 supra for the text of section
212(a)(19), and note 26 infra for the text of section 241(a)(1).
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decision is simple, clear, and pervasive: unless the INS chooses to
base its deportation charges on these specific provisions, as ob-
viously it would not, section 241(f) offers no more than an illusion
of relief from deportation to the illegal alien.
In formulating its decision, the Court relied on its own narrow
interpretation of the holding in Errico and looked to the literal
language of the law, while only obliquely considering the policy
behind it. It is this narrow reading to which the Court pledged its
adherence.' 0 Thus, although Errico has not been expressly over-
ruled, it has been supplanted by a decision which will result in
personal tragedies for many aliens who are most deserving of a de-
portation waiver under the provisions of an extremely harsh act"
and who are among those aliens Congress sought to protect.'2
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE LATE GREAT CASE OF Errico
The need for a waiver of deportation provision became apparent
shortly after World War II, when those who had become homeless
10. 420 U.S. at 629.
11. The Act now has 31 provisions containing grounds for exclusion. Immigration and
Nationality Act §§ 212(a)(1)-(31), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1)-(31) (1970). These overlapping
provisions often have multiple terms, which greatly increase the number of grounds on which
an alien can be excluded. Similarly, although the Act enumerates 18 basic grounds for depor-
tation, §§ 241(a)(1)-(18), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1)-(18), it is estimated that among the multiple
and overlapping terms, there may be hundreds of separate grounds for deportation.
Furthermore, grounds for deportation are retroactive, covering actions which were not
illegal at the time they were committed. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(d), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(d) (1970). Nor is there any statute of limitations during which the INS must either
bring charges or waive the grounds. Id.
The retroactive effect of the deportation provisions has been held not to violate the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson,
353 U.S. 685 (1957), nor does deportation constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Cortez
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 395 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1968). In addition, the Act
places the burden of proof on the alien to prove the alien's admissibility. Immigration and
Nationality Act § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
In regard to procedural due process, only the bare minimum is provided to an alien:
"Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned." United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
The alien apparently has no right to 'substantive due process. See generally 2 C. GORDON AND
H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.2 (rev. ed. 1976).
In addition to the harsh measure of deportation itself, many of the Act's provisions have
criminal sanctions complete with heavy fines and imprisonment. See, e.g., Immigration and
Nationality Act, § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
12. For other discussions of this problem see Griffith, Deportation and the Alien - Some
Aspects, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 329 (1975); Jackson, America's Changing Immigration Policy, 4
LINCOLN L. REV. 72 (1968).
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and stateless during the war sought admission to the United States.
The Displaced Persons Act of 1948's provided for the admission of
war refugees to the United States and represented one of several
legislative efforts to partially humanize an increasingly harsh Act."
Many of the refugees misrepresented their nationality or other infor-
mation in order to avoid being repatriated to a Communist country
and thereby violated section 10 of that Act, which provided that
persons making willful misrepresentations for the purpose of gaining
admission "shall thereafter not be admissible into the United
States." This situation was thought to be so harsh as to merit re-
form. In 1952 when the Act was revised, the House Committee at-
tached a provision which would have saved such refugees from de-
portation when they misrepresented information in order to avoid
repatriation and persecution. This provision was removed by the
Conference Committee which instead substituted an Opinion by the
Committee on how the section should be applied. 5 The INS and the
Attorney General did not apply the statute as the Conference Com-
mittee recommended, believing that the bald statutory language
did not allow for a congressional exception in the form of a mere
written Committee Opinion; thus, the immigrants in question were
deported.
In 1957 a reform act was passed to grant relief from the applica-
tion of such provisions. The purpose was plainly to grant exceptions
to the Act in order to keep family units together." In many instan-
ces, preserving the family was seen as more important than enforc-
13. 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
14. E.g., Financee's Act of 1946, ch. 520, 60 Stat. 339 (1946); War Brides Act of 1945,
ch. 591, § 1, 59 Stat. 659 (to preserve the family units of servicemen with alien spouses and
children).
15. This reads in part as follows:
It is also the opinion of the conferees that the sections of the bill which provide
for the exclusion of aliens who obtained travel documents by fraud or by willfully
misrepresenting a material fact, should not serve to exclude or to deport certain
bona fide refugees who in fear of being forcibly repatriated to their former home-
lands misrepresented their place of birth when applying for a visa and such
misrepresentation did not have as its basis the desire to evade the quota provi-
sions of the law or an investigation in the place of their former residence.
H.R. REP. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1952).
16. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639.
For expressions of congressional concern which preceded its passage, see H.R. REP. No.
1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, (1962); H.R. REP. No. 2096, supra note 15. For congressional
intent see H.R. REP. No. 1199, 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1957) and S. REP. No. 1057, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1957).
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ing strict quota limitations or keeping undesirable aliens out of the
country, such as aliens afflicted with tuberculosis or those who had
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 7
Section 7 of this Act'8 granted relief from deportation for aliens
who had originally gained entry or documentation through fraud or
misrepresentation, but who were the spouse, parent, or child of a
United States citizen and were otherwise admissible. The current
section 241(f) is essentially a re-enactment of section 7 of the 1957
Act, 9 omitting the latter portion which had dealt with war refugees
who made misrepresentations out of fear of persecution. This latter
part covered those refugees who did not possess a special familial
relationship to a United States citizen or permanent resident only
during the years of the war's aftermath, 1945 through 1954. It was
subsequently eliminated in whole because it had served its purpose.
The first part of section 7 was left intact to become the current
section 241(f).10
As the Warren Court pointed out in Errico,2' section 7 of the
1957 amendments waived deportation for two different groups of
aliens who committed a fraud or misrepresentation at the time of
17. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 220 (1966); see War
Brides Act of 1945, ch. 591, § 1, 59 Stat. 659 (1945); GORDON & RoSENFIELD, supra note 11, at
§ 7.11(d).
18. Section 7 of the Act. of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639, 640-41 reads
as follows:
The provisions of section 241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act relating to
the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were
excludable at the time of entry as (1) aliens who have sought to procure, or have
procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud
or misrepresentations, or (2) aliens who were not of the nationality specified in
their visas, shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry
who (A) is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence; or (B) was admitted to the United
States between December 22, 1945, and November 1, 1954, both dates inclusive,
and misrepresented his nationality, place of birth, identity, or residence in apply-
ing for a visa: Provided, That such alien described in clause (B) shall establish
to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the misrepresentation was predi-
cated upon the alien's fear of persecution because of race, religion, or political
opinion if repatriated to his former home or residence, and was not committed
for the purpose of evading the quota restrictions of the immigration laws or an
investigation of the alien at the place of his former home, or residence, or else-
where.
(emphasis added).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1961).
20. Id.
21. 385 U.S. at 222.
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entry. The first group were entitled to the waiver of deportation if
they established that they were the spouse, parent, or child of a
United States citizen, and that they were otherwise admissible. The
second group (who did not have the family relationship noted
above) were entitled to a waiver of deportation if they established
that they were otherwise admissible, that the misrepresentation was
due to fear of persecution upon possible repatriation, and that the
misrepresentation had not been committed for the purpose of evad-
ing the quota restrictions or an investigation of their backgrounds.
The Court reasoned that aliens comprising the first group were
admissible even if their fraud did have the purpose of evading quota
restrictions or an investigation, by reason of their special and close
family relationship to a United States citizen or permanent United
States resident. This conclusion was substantiated by the fact that
the second group of aliens, who might be refugees from Communist
countries, yet who did not have such a family relationship with a
United States citizen, were required to prove that their fraud had
not been for the purpose of avoiding quota restrictions or to impede
an investigation. Thus, the Court found that aliens who did possess
the special family relationships designated in the first part of sec-
tion 7 of the 1957 Act did not have to comply with quota restrictions
in order to be "otherwise admissible" and to have deportation
waived.22 Such an interpretation is consistent with the legislative
intent that where the unity of a family partially composed of United
States citizens is at stake, Congress opted for forgiveness rather
than retribution .23
22. Id. at 223. In support of the Errico analysis of section 241(f)'s development and that
any alien covered by it does not have to additionally satisfy quota requirements in order to
be otherwise admissible, see Wendell & Kolodny, Waiver of Deportation: An Analysis of
Section 241(f) of the Immigration & Nationality Act, 4 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 271, 306 & n.
183:
The court might have further buttressed its argument by noting that the term
"otherwise admissible" was used in both the 1907 and 1917 Acts which antedated
the quota restrictions which first appeared in 1921.
23. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1965); Barber
v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954). In Lee Fook Chuey v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 439 F.2d 244, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1971), the court expressed the legislative intent as
follows:
When Congress enacted this provision, it was reconciling strong and conflicting
policies. . . . Section 241(f) as we have interpreted it, is the result of the ineffec-
tive enforcement of the immigration laws, not the cause of it. . . . Congress made
the wholly reasonable choice that the interest in family unity outweighs the deter-
rent effects of a more draconian policy.
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A. Errico
The Errico and Scott cases presented the following facts. Mr.
Errico, a native of Italy, gained first preference quota status under
the statutory preference scheme in effect at the time by falsely
representing to the immigration authorities that he was a skilled
mechanic in repairing foreign automobiles. He and his wife thus
entered the United States in 1959. A child was born to them in 1960
and became an American citizen at birth.24 In 1963 deportation
proceedings were commenced against the Erricos on the ground that
Mr. Errico was excludable at the time of entry in that he was not
of the quota status specified in the immigrant visa. 5 In Scott, Miss
Scott, a native of Jamaica, contracted a proxy marriage with a
United States citizen solely for the purpose of obtaining non-quota
status for entry under the Act. She entered the United States in
1958 and gave birth to an illegitimate child who became an Ameri-
can citizen at birth. Deportation proceedings were begun when the
fraud was discovered, on the ground that she was not of the non-
quota status specified in her visa. Charges were brought under sec-
tion 241(a)(1) for deportation based on excludability under section
211 dealing with quota limits."
In terms of construction of the deportation provisions of section 241(f), the following rules
have been established: "[D]eportation is a drastic measure, at times the equivalent of
banishment or exile, for which reason deportation status should be given the narrowest of the
several possible meanings." United States ex rel Brancato v. Lehmann, 239 F.2d 663, 666 (6th
Cir. 1956). "Even if there were some doubt as to the correct construction of the statute, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the alien." Errico, supra at 225.
24. Immigration and Nationality Act § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970); cf. Rogers v. Bellei,
401 U.S. 815 (1971).
25. The status of an immediate relative such as Mrs. Errico stems from the status of the
applicant. If the applicant qualifies for preferred treatment, then immediate relatives are
admitted without regard to the numerical limitations (quotas). Immigration and Nationality
Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 115(b) (1970).
26. In both Scott and Errico deportation was based on section 241(a)(1) of the Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1970), which provides:
(a) Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall upon the
order of the Attorney General, be deported who -
(1) at the time of entry was within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable
by the law existing at the time of such entry . ...
Since the aliens in the two cases were not of the quota status listed on their visas, they were
excludable at entry under section 211 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1181 (1970), and therefore,
deportable under section 241(a)(1). Section 211 reads in pertinent part:
With respect to immigrants to be admitted under quotas of quota area prior to
June 30, 1968, no immigrant visa shall be deemed valid unless the immigrant is
properly chargeable to the quota area under the quota of which the visa is issued.
[Vol. 31:1
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Each alien argued that he was saved from deportation by sec-
tion 241(f) of the Act. In Errico, the special inquiry officer of INS
ruled that the alien was not entitled to relief under section 241(f)
because, without compliance with quota requirements, the alien
was not "otherwise admissible at the time of entry." The Board of
Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
Board, holding that such a construction of section 241(f) would strip
it of practically all meaning." In Scott, the deportation order of the
INS was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals, and by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which held
that since the alien was not of the non-quota status claimed in her
visa, she was not entitled to relief under section 241(f) because she
was not "otherwise admissible at the time of entry."28
Upon consolidation, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision
in Errico and reversed the decision in Scott and held, with Chief
Justice Warren writing for six members of the Court, that an alien
who evaded quota restrictions by fraud or misrepresentation was not
denied relief under section 241(f) as an alien not "otherwise admissi-
ble at the time of entry." 9 In broader terms, the Court indicated
that: (1) section 241(f) cannot be limited to a deportation charge
brought under section 212(a)(19) of the Act, which would be the
literal application of section 241(f); (2) such literal application
would contravene the legislative purpose of the 1957 amendments
to the harsh deportation provisions of the original Act of 1952; (3)
since misrepresentations are made about factors which will affect
admissibility, a construction of the section which forgives the misre-
presentation but not the factor misrepresented, would strip the sec-
tion of practical effect; and (4) where there is doubt as to the proper
construction of the Act, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
alien.30 Justices Stewart, Harlan, and White dissented."
27. 349 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1965) (order of deportation vacated). The concurring opinion
states that the statutory language "otherwise admissible refers to matters other than matters
of quota status." Id. at 547 (Duniway, J.)
28. 350 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1965).
29. 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
30. Id. at 217-18, 225. The court in Errico, summarized the available and relevant legis-
lative history of the section 241(f) waiver of deportation provision and the development of
the policies behind the Act. See notes 6-12 of the Errico opinion for a summary of the legis-
lative history. 385 U.S. at 218-23. See also H.R. REP. No. 1199 and S. REP. No. 1057, supra
note 16. See generally GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 11, § 4.1. For an excellent discus-
sion of the development of the history of the Act, see Wendell & Kolodny, supra note 22.
31. 385 U.S. at 225. The dissent based its opinion on two grounds: (1) that section 241
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B. Reid: The New Lead Case
In Reid the aliens, a husband and wife, citizens of British Hon-
duras, entered the United States without a thorough inspection by
the immigration authorities by falsely stating that they were United
States citizens.2 Subsequently they had two children born in the
United States. An order of deportation against the Reids was af-
firmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit,33 and certiorari to the Supreme Court was granted to resolve a
conflict between this holding and a contrary conclusion in the ninth
circuit in Lee Fook Chuey v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,34 which followed Errico.
In Reid, the Burger Court held that the INS could have brought
charges against the Reids under section 212(a)(19), dealing with
general classes of excludable aliens, or under section 241(a)(1), pro-
applies only where a deportation is sought because of fraudulent entry; and (2) even were
section 241 applicable, these two applicants were not otherwise admissible because they
evaded the quota requirements. Typifying the phrase "otherwise admissible" as a term of
art," id. at 229, the dissenters defined it as including quota restrictions. The dissent subse-
quently interpreted legislative history as having shown no intention of Congress to alter or
modify the quota system. Id. at 228 n.4. To allow a waiver for evasion of quota would be
contradictory to this intent. The meaning of section 241(f) is maintained, according to the
dissent, by applying it to the many countries not restricted by quotas whose emigrants would
benefit therefrom.
32. When an alien, as in Reid, comes into customs or INS inspection facilities and in
reply to a question concerning his nationality, that alien falsely claims to be a United States
citizen, a question arises as to how such an obvious misrepresentation at the time of entry
gets converted into an entry "without inspection." Clearly the alien went through customs
facilities, was physically observed, and was questioned.
The Court and INS consider the above facts to constitute an entry without inspection
because immigration officials do not question as closely persons who claim to be United
States citizens as they do others in order to determine their admissibility. Note, however, that
in truth, this is not a failure of the alien to be inspected, but a failure by immigration officials
to inspect. These aliens do not have United States passports, documents, or identification.
They simply assert that they are United States citizens. There is no logical reason why the
immigration officials should cease to question them when they have no United States identifi-
cation. In fact, immigration officers have both the power and the duty to question thoroughly
anyone who cannot document his citizenship to the satisfaction of the officer. Federal
regulations stipulate: "[flf such an applicant for admission fails to satisfy the examining
immigration officer that he is a U.S. citizen, he shall thereafter be inspected as an alien." 8
C.F.R. § 235.1(b) (1976) (emphasis added). See also Immigration and Nationality Act § 235,
8 U.S.C. § 1225 (a) (1970).
33. 492 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1974), noted in, 54 B.U.L. REV. 851 (1974).
34. 439 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1970).
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viding deportation if excludable at time of entry, and thus the aliens
would have been saved from deportation by section 241(f). But since
the INS brought charges under section 241(a)(2)35 instead, the Court
held that the waiver provision of section 241(f) would not apply. The
Court viewed section 241(a)(2) as a separate and independent
ground for deportation, independent of all section 212 grounds for
initial excludability, which are also grounds for deportation under
section 241(a)(1).11
The Court found section 241(f) inapplicable because "by its
terms [it] grants relief against deportation of aliens 'on the ground
that they were excludable at the time of entry . . . .' "I Further-
more, "[tihe language of § 241(f) tracks with the provisions of §
212(a)(19) . . . dealing with aliens who are excludable."3 Later, the
Court indicated that "the 'explicit language' of § 241(f) . . . waives
deportation for aliens who are 'excludable at the time of entry' by
reason of the fraud specified in § 212(a)(19), and for that reason
deportable under the provisions of § 241(a)(1)." 3 1 In addition to
having held earlier that section 241(f) did not apply to section
241(a)(2), the Court later limited the waiver to charges brought
35. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1970) provides:
(a) Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall upon the
order of the Attorney General, be deported who...
(2) entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place other
than as designated by the Attorney General or is in the United States in violation
of this chapter or in violation of any other law of the United States.
36. 420 U.S. at 622 n.2, 623. Although the Reid Court quotes and subsequently misquotes
the recognized immigration law authority of Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration Law and
Procedure, in support of the proposition that a deportation charge brought under section
241(a)(2) (entry without inspection) is "independent" and, therefore, somehow exclusive of
all others (namely the waiver of deportation provision of section 241(f)), section 241(a)(2) is
an alternative and not exclusive provision upon which a deportation charge can be based. A
single set of facts can give rise to a deportation charge under any of many separate provisions.
The facts covered by section 241(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1970) are facts which result in
excludability under section 212(a)(19) and from which one would naturally think a deporta-
tion charge under section 241(a)(1) would shortly follow, but the deportation charge can be
based on section 241(a)(2) (entry without inspection) just as well. (See note 67 infra for text
of section 241(c)). See also GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 11, §§ 4.1(b), 4.7(c) concerning
section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (1970), which is a waiver of grounds for exclusion
based on family relationship, as section 241(f).is a waiver of grounds for deportation based
on family relationship. The waiver of section 212(i) of the Act has been applied to waive
exclusion where based on entry without inspection, Matter of Y, 8 I. & N. Dec. 143 (1959)
(alien falsely represented that he was a United States citizen).
37. 420 U.S. at 623.
38. Id. at 622.
39. Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
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under section 212(a)(19).40
Reference was made to lower court decisions" which have al-
lowed the waiver of deportation of section 241(f) to be applied to
acts subsequent to entry on a theory that there was an undisclosed
fraudulent intent, rather than an overt action, at the time of entry.
The Court indicated that this was an irrational result because aliens
with United States citizens in their families are saved from deporta-
tion if they can prove their dishonesty, while aliens with United
States citizens in their families but who cannot prove their undis-
closed fraudulent intent, are deported. The Court also refered to one
other lower court decision, which held that section 241(f) waived
deportation under section 241(a)(1) even if there was no fraud
involved.4
Section 241(f) waives deportation for charges involving fraud,
which is committed at the time of entry. If there are lower court
decisions which have extended section 241(f) further than it can go
by its own terms, then the Court could and should overrule those
decisions; but there is nothing in a few liberal decisions which justi-
fies a restrictive literal interpretation of the waiver which, in viola-
tion of congressional purpose, functionally eliminates section 241(f)
from the Act.
Furthermore, when section 241(f) is correctly applied to the
events surrounding the time of entry, there is nothing legislatively
irrational about it. It makes sense to have such a provision which,
in consideration of the policy of preserving the family units of
United States citizens and permanent residents, forgives fraud com-
mitted at the time of entry for certain aliens. It would make little
sense to have a provision waiving deportation for aliens who at the
time of entry did not make any misrepresentations because (1) if
they did not make any misrepresentations but were ineligible for
40. Id. at 630. Errico seems to hold to the contrary, however, for the Court stated:
At the outset it should be noted that even the Government agrees that § 241(f)
cannot be applied with strict literalness. Literally, § 241(f) applies only when the
alien is charged with entering in violation of § 212(a)(19) of the statute. . . . The
Government concedes that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the
manifest purpose of the section, and the administrative authorities have consis-
tently held that § 241(0 waives any deportation charge that results directly from
the misrepresentation regardless of the section of the statute under which the
charge was brought . ...
385 U.S. at 217.
41. 420 U.S. at 629.
42. Id., citing In re Yuen Lan Hom, 289 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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admission, they remain outside the country, and (2) if they did not
make any misrepresentations and were eligible for admission any-
way, they are not going to be facing a deportation charge-unless it
is for something that they have done since entry. In either instance
the section 241(f) exception does not apply. Thus, despite the smoke
screen thrown up by the Court, section 241(f), waiving fraud or
misrepresentation at the time of entry for aliens who now have
families composed partially of United States citizens, cannot be
said to be irrational because there is not a corollary provision for
people who do not need one.
Section 241(f) is highly dependent upon its legislative history
since its language standing alone has proven difficult to apply. It is,
therefore, disheartening that Reid dealt very little with legislative
history. It did acknowledge that the congressional intent of section
241(f) was to "[grant] relief to limited classes of aliens whose fraud
was of such a nature that it was more than counterbalanced by
after-acquired family ties."43 Unfortunately, there was no discussion
of the type of fraud which can be off-set by familial ties.
In the footnote to this acknowledgement of congressional intent
the Court indicated:
The legislative history of this provision, designed primarily to
prevent the deportation of refugees from totalitarian nations for
harmless misrepresentations made solely to escape persecution,
is fully consistent with our interpretation of the provision.44
It is submitted that this is an incorrect interpretation of legisla-
tive history since it was not the (B) part of section 7 of the 1957 Act
(dealing with the entrance of war refugees between the years of 1945
and 1954) which was the forerunner of section 241(f),45 but the first
part of section 7 which remains intact today. The significance of this
fact cannot be overlooked since the first part of section 7 empha-
sized the family relationships of the alien and did not require quota
compliance, whereas the latter part of section 7, now repealed, did
not emphasize the family and did require quota compliance!
Furthermore, examination of section 7(B) shows that it waived mis-
representations concerning "nationality, place of birth, identity, or
residence.""4 Nationality and place of birth are factors which would
43. Id. at 630.
44. Id. n.8.
45. See notes 18 and 19 supra and accompanying text.
46. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, § 7 (B), Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639, 641.
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
be crucial to determining an alien's quota status, and identity is a
factor which would be crucial in conducting an investigation into an
alien's background. Therefore, the Act did not waive only "harm-
less" misrepresentations, but material misrepresentations which
were intended by Congress to be waived. These are certainly two
important points in the legislative history of section 241(f), and it
is not encouraging that the Court did not appear to consider such
clear language. As the dissenting Justices in Reid lamented: "Today
the Court strains to construe statutory language against the alien."47
II. LIMITATION OF THE SECTION 241(f) WAIVER
A. A False Schism is Created: Excludable/Deportable
There are several devices that the United States Supreme
Court uses in order to drastically reduce the viability of section
241(f). The first device is embodied in an effort to create a false
schism between the words "excludable" and "deportable." The
Court attempted to establish the idea that there is a great difference
in significance between these two words: "Because of the com-
plexity of Congressional enactments relating to immigration, some
understanding of the structure of these laws is required before evalu-
ating the legal contentions of petitioners."" In introducing the Act,
the Court emphasized that "[s]ection 212 of the Act . . .specifies
various grounds for exclusion of aliens seeking admission to this
country, [whereas] [s]ection 241 . . . specifies grounds for
deportation of aliens already in this country."4
The Court discussed the factual situation of the deportation
under section 241(a)(2) refering to the well-known treatise, Gordon
and Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure, for support of the
Court's proposition that: "Entry without inspection is grounds for
deportation under § 241(a)(2) even though the alien was not ex-
cludable at the time of entry under § 241(a)(1) . . . .It is a basis
for deportation wholly independent of any basis for deportation
which may exist under § 241(a)(1)."50
From this point on the Court seemed to misquote its own propo-
sition. For example: "Section 241(a)(2) establishes as a separate
47. 420 U.S. at 634 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
48. Id. at 621.
49. Id. (emphasis added by the Court).
50. Id. at 622 n.2.
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ground for deportation, quite independently of whether the alien
was excludable at the time of his arrival, the failure of an alien to
present himself for inspection at the time he made his entry."', This
differs from the statement quoted above that section 241(a)(2) is a
ground for deportation "even though the alien was not excludable
at the time of entry under § 241(a)(1)." (emphasis added). Merely
because an alien does not have to be excludable at the time of entry
under section 241(a)(1) in order to be deportable under section
241(a)(2), does not mean that an alien was not excludable at the
time of entry.5"
It is important to ascertain why the Court tried to create a di-
chotomy between the grounds for excludability and deportability.
The reason is apparent in its statement that "nothing in the waiver
provision of § 241(f), which by its terms grants relief against depor-
tation of aliens 'on the ground that they were excludable at the time
of entry,' has any bearing on the case"5 (the Reid case is based on
section 241(a)(2)). This appears to be the Court's motive in trying
to create a schism between grounds for excludability and grounds
for deportability; it is done in order to claim that section 241(f)
cannot apply to a section 241(a)(2) deportation for failure to be
inspected.
Note, however, that in order to get to this claim, it seems that
the Court must misconstrue its own authority and also section
241(f) as it relates to its ground for waiver. The Court's construction
of section 241(f) simply eliminates the wording "sought to procure
. . . entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation"
from section 241(f) since in the future, the very same conduct will
be termed "entering without inspection," and will be routed
through section 241(a)(2), where the Court said the section 241(f)
forgiveness clause cannot touch it.
Furthermore, there does not seem to be any such schism in the
Act between the grounds for excludability and grounds for deporta-
bility for several reasons: (1) the Act does not differentiate exclusion
from deportation by the inclusion of separate definitions;"4 (2) many
of the provisions of the Act overlap immensely with each other and
51. Id. at 623.
52. See notes 55-58 infra and accompanying text.
53. 420 U.S. at 623.
54. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1970).
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apparently without any rigid demarcation between exclusion
grounds and deportation grounds other than the title captions for
section 212 and section 241; and (3) a provision such as section
241(a)(2) makes every conceivable ground under the Act and every
violation of any law of the United States a ground for deportation,
thus rendering the whole question meaningless. The last clause of
section 241(a)(2) stipulates deportation for any alien "who is in the
United States in violation of this chapter or in violation of any other
law of the United States." (emphasis added). In other words, any
provision of the Act, as well as any violation of any provision of any
law relating to presence within the United States is a ground for
deportation.
Thus it is clear that the invention by the Court which prevented
section 241(f) from applying to section 241(a)(2), has the effect of
reading section 241(f) entirely-and not just the language concern-
ing "entry"-out of the Act, because any deportation charge can be
routed through section 241(a)(2) and now be completely untouched
by section 241(f) where, by the facts of the case, it should apply. The
question remains whether the will and purpose of Congress to waive
deportation for a certain class of aliens (those who have been in the
United States for some time, are part of families at least partially
composed of United States citizens, and who are facing deportation
not for anything that they have done since being in the United
States but solely for a past misrepresentation at the time of entry)
should be completely frustrated on the basis of a fictitious schism.
It is submitted that this simply could not be the congressional
intention.
B. Statutory Language is Made Rigidly Technical
The scope of the section 241(f) waiver is complicated by its
awkward phraseology. 55 For example, what is the meaning of the
words "excludable at the time of entry?" If there is a provision of
the deportation section which would cover an alien who obtained
entry by making a fraudulent statement at the time of entry, is it
covered by section 241(f) even though the provision does not explic-
itly mention that such persons would also have been excludable at
the time of entry? The Reid Court used this interpretation as a
55. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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wedge to limit the applicability of section 241(f) by treating the
phrase "excludable at the time of entry" as technical language and
maintaining that section 241(f) applied only if the provision under
which an alien is charged specifically recites these precise words.
Perhaps avoiding the immigration authorities by falsely claim-
ing to be United States citizens can constitute entering without
inspection, but it is also apparent that aliens making such a state-
ment gained entry into the United States by making a fraudulent
representation at the time of entry. It would seem apparent, there-
fore, that section 241(f) would apply (where its internal terms are
met) to deportation proceedings under section 241(a)(2) for entering
without inspection. But how technical is the language in section
241(f) about aliens "excludable at the time of entry" for obtaining
false documentation or entry by fraud? If the deportation charge to
be waived by section 241(f) must explicitly use the words "excluda-
ble at the time of entry," then section 241(f) does not waive deporta-
tion under section 241(a)(2) for entering without inspection. On the
other hand, if an alien went to immigration inspection facilities and
then refused, for example, to answer any questions put by the offi-
cials, who can doubt that the alien would be excludable? Clearly
someone who refused to answer inspection questions would be ex-
cludable at the time of entry.
The real difference between being excludable and being deport-
able is the time at which one is apprehended. If one is apprehended
at the time of entry, one is said to be excludable, for it is concep-
tually difficult to "deport" someone who has not yet entered the
country. However, if one is apprehended after entering, then one is
said to be deportable. It is important to note that the Immigration
Act section on definitions" does not define or differentiate the words
"excludable" or "deportable." Therefore, it is unlikely that the lan-
guage in section 241(f) was intended to have a rigid technical appli-
cation.
The Reids came to the attention of the immigration authorities
after entry, and, therefore, were "deportable." This, however, does
not mean that they were not excludable at the time of entry. The
simple fact is that if they had been caught in the falsehood at the
time of entering the country, they clearly would have been excluda-
ble under section (a)(19), as aliens who sought to obtain entry by
56. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1970).
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willfully misrepresenting a material fact. The relevant question is
whether they would have been excludable for the attempted fraud
if they had been detected at the time. If so, and the answer is clearly
yes, then the aliens are deportable when the immigration process
catches up with them under section 241(a)(1) or (2), and just as
clearly, section 241(f) should apply to their cases where its terms are
met.
If the Court is saying, however, that had the Reids been re-
quested to submit to inspection questions at the time they entered
the United States, and they had refused to do so or been caught in
a falsehood at the time, they would not have been excludable, then
it is engaging in semantic games. Call it "exclusion" or call it "pre-
emptive deportation," the fact is that whether excludable or deport-
able, the Reids would not have gotten into the United States. In-
deed, the Act apparently does not make any significant distinction
between grounds for exclusion and grounds for deportation. The
difference between whether an alien is excludable or deportable
seems to be the time the alien is detected."
Section 241(a)(2) (which the INS relied upon in Reid to effect
deportation) is in itself an excellent example of the non-technical
shotgun manner in which the Act operates.5" The provision covers
just about all possible circumstances: (1) aliens who managed to get
into the country by circumventing immigration inspection authori-
ties entirely; (2) aliens who might be in violation of any provision
of the Act, regardless of whether it is individually specified in sec-
tion 241(a)(2); and (3) aliens who might be in violation of any law
of the United States. If this provision applied to United States
citizens, the country would be depopulated. It cannot be said that
the Act sets up highly specific, technical grounds for exclusion as
opposed to deportation, or that the grounds are exclusive of one
another. The Act just does not work that way; it is much more of a
shotgun action.
57. There is a situation in which a distinction between an alien's being excludable or
being deportable is of significance, that is, in determining what procedural rights an alien
has at his hearing. Although the due process rights of an alien are extremely limited (see note
11 supra) an alien who has been actually living within the United States for some time
(deportable) is felt to have a right to more procedural safeguards in a hearing than is an alien
who has not yet made an entry into the country. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
Note, however, that the distinction is made concerning procedural rights and not concerning
the grounds for removing the alien from our shores. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 935 (1968).
58. "Entry," however, is something of a technical word. See id.
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Nor can a rationale be found for drastically limiting the appli-
cation of the section 241(f) waiver by saying that it is as broad in
its forgiveness as section 241(a)(2) is in its thrust to deport. Section
241(f) can only apply to a deportation charge brought under section
241(a)(2) when the alien gained the entry without inspection
through use of a fraudulent device at the time of entry, was "other-
wise admissible" at the time of entry, is the spouse, parent, or child
of a United States citizen or permanent resident, and when the alien
has committed no action subsequent to entry which would render
him independently deportable. This is precisely why the Act is
known as a harsh act: almost any alien can be excluded or deported
under it and separated forcibly from both chosen country and from
dearest relatives. This was the impetus for the reform movement
and the amendments of 1957. Yet, it appears that the United States
Supreme Court is dismantling these humanitarian amendments, for
certainly there is nothing in its treatment of section 241(f) which
indicates that any other humanitarian provision is going to fare any
better.
C. The Final Undoing: Waiving the Immaterial
The Court employed one more device to render section 241(f)
useless. This final undoing concerns the meaning of the phrase in
section 241(f) which says that certain deportation provisions "shall
not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry."
(emphasis added). This phrase was not at issue in the Reid case,
and therefore, the discussion relating to it is dictum, but the Court
has signaled the INS that they can, through the device to be ex-
plained, again use section 211(a)59 and any other deportation sec-
tion, without section 241(f) waiving any deportation order issued.
The question concerning the phrase "otherwise admissible" re-
lates to whether section 241(f), when applied to an appropriate case,
forgives the whole transaction comprising the deportation charge or
whether it merely forgives the misrepresentation (but not the fact
misrepresented). Under the former interpretation, the alien is "oth-
erwise admissible" if the alien is in conformity with all the remain-
ing provisions of the Act. Under the latter interpretation, the alien
59. Section 211(a) is the section of the Act upon which deportation charges were brought
in Errico and Scott and relates to satisfaction of numerical requirements (quotes). See note
26 supra, for text of section.
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is not "otherwise admissible" unless he is in conformity with all the
remaining provisions of the Act, and also with the very provision he
is charged with misrepresentifng.
The Errico case dealt with precisely this question in the context
of section 211(a), the provision relating to requirements of the quota
system. After a lengthy examination of legislative history, the Errico
opinion held that Congress intended section 241(f) to be effective in
preserving intact families partially composed of United States citi-
zens, and that section 241(f) was meant to forgive the whole transac-
tion-the lie and the factor lied about-as long as the alien was
otherwise admissible under the remaining provisions of the Act.'"
Then in Reid the Court asserted:
We adhere to the holding of that case [Errico], which we take
to be that where the INS chooses not to seek deportation under
the obviously available provisions of § 212(a)(19) relating to the
fraudulent procurement of visas, documentation, or entry, but
instead asserts a failure to comply with those separate require-
ments of § 211(a), dealing with compliance with quota require-
ments, as a ground for deportation under § 241(a)(1), § 241(f)
waives the fraud on the part of the alien in showing compliance
with the provisions of § 211(a).11
At this point it can be realized that a waiver of fraud on the
part of the alien "in showing compliance" with the provisions of
section 211(a) does not include waiver of the non-compliance itself,
but only the attempt of the alien not to reveal the lack of conform-
ity. This is phrased in terms of the alien not being otherwise admis-
sible due to failure to conform with the provision which concerned
the misrepresentation. This interpretation of the above statement
by the Reid Court is entirely consistent with the almost violent
dissent filed in the Errico case by Justices White and Stewart, who
today are among the majority in the Reid case, and who obviously
have not changed their view.62
Therefore, even in the small number of situations where section
241(f) might still be applicable, it is rendered useless. The people
who need such a waiver are those who made a material misrepresen-
tation, but they will now be deported nonetheless because the pres-
60. 385 U.S. at 217-19.
61. 420 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added).
62. See note 31 supra.
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ent interpretation of section 241(f) forgives only the act of making
a misrepresentation and not the factor which the alien found neces-
sary to conceal in order to obtain entry. Now that the alien must
be in conformity with the provision under which the deportation
charge is brought, it is clear that section 241(f) will relate only to
totally immaterial misrepresentations of people who were always
eligible for entry, and who probably made accidental misrepresen-
tations. As such, the section hardly merits the term of "waiver."
Ironically, the Reid opinion said that the waiver did not apply
"to any of the grounds of excludability specified in § 212(a) other
than subsection 19" of that provision. 3 Yet that section refers to
"willfully misrepresenting a material fact"! Thus, it is submitted,
by sheer force of statutory language within the only provision to
which the Reid Court allowed section 241(f) to apply, the waiver
provisions should apply to material misrepresentations. The scope
imposed upon section 241(f) by the Court is greatly at odds with the
acts it should forgive under section 212(a)(19), that is, willful mis-
representations of material facts. This is indicative that the Court
was not interested in making sense out of section 241(f), but simply
in severely limiting its application.
IV. LIGHT FROM OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
The proposition that the section 241(f) waiver of deportation
provision was intended to apply to other subsections of the section
241 deportation provision, including a section 241(a)(2) entry with-
out inspection, finds strong apparent support in section 241(d),
"[aipplicability to all aliens," which provides: "Except as other-
wise specifically provided in this section, the provisions of this sec-
tion shall be applicable to all aliens belonging to any of the classes
enumerated in subsection (a) of this section." 4
Thus section 241(f) was intended to apply to section 241(a)(2),
as well as to any other subsection of section 241(a) to which it can
by its own terms apply. The only exception is something which is
"otherwise specifically provided in this section." Nowhere in section
241 is there anything which specifically provides that the waiver of
section 241(f) shall not apply to section 241(a)(2)-in fact, it takes
63. 420 U.S. at 630.
64. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1970) (emphasis
added).
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a great deal of intellectualizing to even make the argument that it
does not. The Court's argument to that effect in Reid, " is in fact a
significant, albeit silent, admission that there is nothing in section
241 which specifically limits the scope of section 241(f) to certain
provision(s) and not to others. Yet there is a provision which says
that all of the provisions of the section apply to all the subsections
of section 241(a).
In order to illustrate what kind of specific provision is required
by section 241(d) in order to limit the scope of any of the provisions
of the section, the language of section 241(b) is notable:
The provisions of subsection (a)(4) of this section respecting the
deportation of an alien convicted of a crime or crimes shall not
apply (1) ...The provisions of this subsection shall not apply
in the case of any alien who is charged with being deportable from
the United States under subsection(a)(11) of this section.
Note that all provisions of section 241 apply by virtue of section
241(d) to all subsections of section 241(a) "except as otherwise spe-
cifically provided in this section," and section 241(b) illustrates how
this is done. The provision is referred to by its individual number
and letter and then is specifically limited. Nothing so limits the
scope of section 241(f).
Furthermore, note the language of section 241(f): "The provi-
sions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens . . . shall
not apply . . ." For what purpose did Congress refer to "provi-
sions" in the plural if it only intended section 241(f) to apply to one
subsection, section 241(a)(1), per the Reid court?
In addition section 241(c), 7 indicates that when drafting this
legislation, Congress anticipated certain abuses of familial relation-
ships and took affirmative steps to prevent those relationships
which it did not deem meritorious from impeding the deportation
65. 420 U.S. at 623.
66. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970).
67. Id. § 241(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1970):
An alien shall be deported as having procured a visa or other documentation by
fraud within the meaning of paragraph (19) of section 1182(a) of this title .. .
unless such alien shall establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that
such marriage was not contracted for the purpose of evading any provisions of the
immigration laws; or (2) it appears to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that
he or she has failed or refused to fulfill his or her marital agreement which in the
opinion of the Attorney General was hereafter made for the purpose of procuring
his or her entry as an immigrant.
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process. Although section 241(f) may have some awkward phraseol-
ogy, it was not enacted thoughtlessly or as a carte blanche. It was
enacted, as its terms indicate, to protect certain aliens with certain
family relationships from deportation, just as section 241(c) was
enacted to avoid protecting other aliens with family relationships
whom Congress did not deem meritorious enough to warrant a
waiver of deportation.
Consideration must also be given to section 212(i)" which is a
waiver of excludability for certain aliens seeking entrance to the
United States who have the same family relationships for which
deportation is waived by section 241(f). This section again indicates
Congress' serious intention to protect these family relationships.
Unlike section 241(f), however, the section 212(i) waiver of excluda-
bility is discretionary with the Attorney General. Although the
rights of aliens are quite limited, 9 those who have been in the
United States and have, therefore, put down some roots here, are
given more consideration than aliens who are merely seeking entry.
Thus, while section 212(i) is discretionary, the waiver of deportation
under section 241(f) is mandatory: "The provisions of this section
• . . shall not apply to. . . the spouse, parent, or a child of a United
States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence." Congress felt so strongly about protecting these family rela-
tionships, that it even extended a discretionary waiver of section
212(i) to aliens with these relationships who had not yet even en-
tered the United States!70
V. THE Reid DECISION RENDERS THE ACT IRRATIONAL
The Reid decision limiting the scope of section 241(f) would
seem to render the Act irrational. As long as the waiver of deporta-
tion provisions of section 241(f) is applicable whenever the internal
terms are satisfied, the Act has a high degree of rationality because
the ultimate result of deportation cases with identical facts will be
68. Id. § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (1970) (formerly § 212(h)):
Any alien who is the spouse, parent, or child of a United States citizen or of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence and who is excludable because
(1) . . . may be granted a visa and admitted to the United States for permanent
residence . . ..
69. See notes 11 and 57 supra regarding procedural due process.
70. See also note 25 supra.
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the same, regardless of which deportation provisions are used to
charge the aliens. The alien will either be deported or not deported,
depending solely on whether the waiver terms of section 241(f) meet
the facts of the case. 71
Where, however, limits are set on the scope of section 241(f)
which relate to artificial technicalities, rather than to its terms, the
Act becomes irrational in purpose and effect. This is so because the
facts of one social transaction by one alien can often be the basis
for deportation under more than one provision. 72 The INS can sim-
ply then bring the charge under a section from which the Court has
blocked off section 241(f). This is a shopping license for the INS,
which becomes the sole determiner of the ultimate outcome of the
case. By simply basing the charge on one deportation provision
rather than another the INS decides how aliens in the same situa-
tion will be treated-deported or saved.
An excellent example of this provision-shopping is found in the
Errico and Scott cases which the Court in Reid outlines rather ex-
plicitly:
INS could clearly have proceeded against either Scott or Errico
under § 212(a)(19), on the basis of their procuring a visa or other
documentation by fraud or misrepresentation. Just as clearly
Scott and Errico could have then asserted their claim to the
benefit of § 241(f) . . . Instead the INS relied on the provisions
of § 211(a) . . .,
In the Reid case itself, the INS passed over not merely one other
provision as in Errico, but two other provisions until they found one
which they believed would result in deportation. They passed over
both section 212(a)(19) and section 211(a) because Errico held that
section 241(f) would apply where its terms were met under each of
71. Section 241(f) does not waive deportation for anything an alien does after entry into
the United States. Khadjenouri v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 460 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.
1972). It waives only fraud at entry which the immigration process failed to detect but which
INS attempts to assert after the alien has become part of a family containing United States
citizens or permanent residents.
72. The Court in Reid itself is quite aware of this. See the portion of Reid opinion, 420
U.S. at 630, quoted in the text of this article at p. 20.
Note also that significant civil rights issues, such as the first amendment right of the
American public to hear foreign speakers, have been litigated in the context of whether the
speaker has a right to be in the United States, i.e., in the context of the immigration laws.
See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
73. 420 U.S. at 627.
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these provisions. 4 Thus, the Reids and their two children were de-
ported.
The Reid Court approved of and aided this provision-shopping;
in fact, it is the Reid decision which makes this approach possible
in the future. The Errico Court applied section 241(f) whenever its
internal terms were met, regardless of the provision under which the
charge was brought, and the Act functioned rationally. The very
real effect under the current approach, however, is that section
241(f) is eliminated from the Act altogether. Under Reid, the INS
can always bring any deportation charge under the catchall provi-
sion of section 241(a)(2) which, in addition to entering without
inspection, covers any violation of the Act and any violation of any
law relating to presence within the United States. It is submitted
that surely this was not the intent of Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
The legislative history of section 241(f) indicates that Congress
intended the waiver to have an ameliorative effect upon orders of
deportation made to aliens who entered the country through some
form of misrepresentation, and who have families composed par-
tially of United States citizens or lawful permanent resident aliens.
The Warren Court in Errico followed this intent based upon the
policy of preserving the family unit. It is submitted that the Burger
Court's holding in Reid that section 241(f) applies exclusively to
deportation charges based on section 212(a)(19) and brought under
section 241(a)(1), disregarded the legislative purpose of the Act, and
so constricted legal precedent, as to render section 241(f) a nullity.
In a land of immigrants, the sign now reads: "No immigrants
need apply." There should be no illusions about this; the Supreme
Court has enunciated a new policy in favor of deportation and now
"strains to construe statutory language against the alien."75 The
presumption of Errico has been reversed; the alien no longer receives
the benefit of the doubt. It is a new Court, and an aging Frontier.
74. Id. at 623, and dissenting opinion at 630.
75. Id. at 634 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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